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MUNICIPAL PLANNING
So may the city that I love be great
Till every stone shall be articulate.
-WILLIAm DUDLEY FOULKE, The City's Crownt.
MUNICIPAL PLANNING-A DECADE OF REAPPRAISAL
SAMUEL T. LAWTON, JR., AND EDWARD S. STERNRECOGNITION BY THE Illinois courts of the importance of com-
munity planning has been one of the significant developments
of the last decade in the field of municipal law. The zoning
ordinance correlated to comprehensive municipal objectives the earlier
legal restrictions on land use found in the licensing ordinances, private
restrictive covenants, and the common law of nuisance.' In recent
years, the zoning ordinance itself has become a true adjunct and tool
of the overall planning process. 2 Zoning regulations and the restric-
tions on the subdivision of land by local governments are now tested
by the courts in terms of their relationship to the development of the
community as a whole and no longer solely in terms of the economic
loss to the individual landowner resulting from the restrictions placed
upon the use of his property.
After World War II, agricultural and unimproved lands in the areas
adjacent to the major urban centers began to feel the effects of the
great movements of population and, to a lesser extent, industry, away
from the larger cities into the outer limits of the surrounding metro-
politan areas.3 Communities, confronted by the breakup of farm land
1 METZENBAUM, ZONING 1-51 (1955).
2 Note, 28 IND. L. J. 544, 547 (1953).
3 It was estimated in 1957 that by 1960 the population of the City of Chicago would
represent approximately 61% of that in the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Area
(Lake, Cook, Kane, DuPage and Will Counties in Illinois, and Lake County, Indiana),
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into residential and industrial sites and by the onrush of former city
dwellers and other new residents who came to live or work in the com-
munity, turned to the tools of planning, zoning, and subdivision regula-
tion to control the effect of the invasion.4
and that by 1980 it would be only 52%, although there would be an overall population
increase of approximately 1,500,000. In 1950, the population of the city represented
approximately 67% of that of the Metropolitan Area. NORTHEASTERN ILL. METROPOLITAN
AREA LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES COMM'N, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN CHICAGO
METROPOLITAN AREA 35 (1957).
The population of Cook County outside of Chicago increased 62 % from 1947 to 1957.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, COOK COUNTY, A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR REZONING COOK
COUNTY 2 (1957). The population of Lake County, Illinois, increased 61.6% between
1950 and 1960. LAKE COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY POPULATION
REPORT, Table III (1960).
In the eight years from 1947 through 1954, 400 new firms were established in the
metropolitan ring as compared to 268 new firms in Chicago. "This fact illustrates the
tendency of newer firms to locate in the ring in a pattern of diffusion, while Chicago
has drawn upon expansion of existing establishments to continue to build up its base."
NORTHEASTERN ILL. METROPOLITAN AREA LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES COMM'N, op. Cit.
supra at 41. See also CHICAGO AREA TRANSPORTATION STUDY 5-15 (1960).
4 Gulick, Goals for Metropolis, 49 NAT'L Civic REV. 586, 587 (1960) states: "It is cus-
tomary to credit this explosion to the automobile. This is only part of the story. Other
things are involved, principally the rise of family incomes, the ubiquitous transmission
of electricity and communications, all-weather roads and expressways, septic tanks and
driven wells, and social changes, especially the shorter workday and week and new
techniques of corporate organization and management. When these changes made it
possible to get skilled urban labor in the suburbs and urban customers in the 'country,'
dispersed factories and shopping centers added their influence to the scatteration....
"Unless we can quickly develop community controls which we do not yet have in
most areas, much of suburbia will soon be destroyed by its very popularity."
Further, in NORTHEASTERN ILL. METROPOLITAN AREA LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES
COMM'N, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 5 (1957):
"The automobile is commonly cited as a major cause of this expansion outside the
central city and within the ring. Not only has it helped to stimulate suburban residence,
as earlier suggested, but it has stimulated suburban location of industry by lessening the
need for physical proximity of plant and labor supply. But the automobile is far from
the only factor which has contributed to this development. Decentralizing forces in-
clude the fact that, as new industries and new plants seek a location where there will be
contact with the industrial and commercial facilities already developed in a city, they
are not always able to find suitable sites within the municipal boundaries. The develop-
ment of one-story plants, appropriate to modem assembly-line production, has added
to the need for space.
"Technological changes which have been under way for a long period have had their
influence. Location near a railroad, to make coal available for the generation of steam
power, is no longer a necessity since the invention of the electric motor, which can, at
distant points, use centrally generated power. The use of trucks for supplies and distri-
bution of products has also relieved some industries from the need of a railroad location.
"It is an error, however, to assume that, because of the forces attracting population
and industry to the areas surrounding central cities, the centralizing forces are ex-
hausted or that, because of them, our great cities are collapsing. While the population
increase in the ring of the Chicago Metropolitan Area, for example, during the last
census period was 446,000, and that within the City of Chicago was 224,000 persons, this
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I(COMMUNITY PLANNING"-DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT
Community planning is the science, or perhaps, the art, of placing
the various physical components of a community in their proper rela-
tionship to each other and of providing for their continued harmonious
existence in this relationship. Planning consists not only of making
provisions for the location and development of residential areas but
also of providing (a) adequate industrial, commercial, retail, and
service areas to serve the economic needs of the community, (b) con-
venient school sites to provide for its educational needs, (c) parks and
other open areas to maintain its beauty and serve the recreational needs
of its citizens, and (d) public buildings and other public facilities to
enable the local government to provide the required services. 5 Plan-
ning is more than subdivision control and zoning regulation, but these
are the principal legal tools for implementing the plan that has been
established for the community.6 Whereas, subdivision controls regu-
late the division of land into buildable lots and the establishing of
requirements for streets and other public facilities to serve those lots,
zoning determines the size of lots, the manner in which they may be
developed, and the location of the various uses which are necessary to
the life of the community. Both devices determine how land may be
developed to promote the public welfare.
increase within the city itself is greater than the total population of Syracuse and only
some 20,000 less than the population of such cities as Dayton, Oklahoma City, and
Omaha. The increase in population per square mile within Chicago's 213 square miles
in that decade was 1,105, while in the 3,617 square miles of the ring area it was 82. There
were almost three times as many new manufacturing plants established within the city
proper between the last two censuses of manufacturing as in the ring area. Retail sales
within the city increased by almost two and a half times as much as in the metropolitan
area outside the city."~Between 1947 and 1957 over 140,000 homes were built in Cook County, excluding
Chicago. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CooK CoUrNTY, op. cit. supra note 3.
5 For a definition of municipal planning, see Grosso v. Board of Adjustment, 137
N. J. L. 630, 631, 61 A.2d 167, 168 (1948). See also, AMERICAN Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFI-
CIALS, PLANNING 1959 at 38 (1959); Fisher, For Tomorrow's City, 50 NAT'L Civic REV. 12
(1961).
6A typical municipal plan may also include various studies of land use, population
distribution, transportation facilities, topographical features, and sewage and drainage
areas in addition to a street plan, a public facilities, school, and park plan, and possibly
a separate business district and off-street parking plan and a public transportation plan.
See, for example, Cny OF HIGHLAND PARK, ILL., OFFICIAL CITY PLAN (1947). Within the
past several years a number of Illinois communities have been incorporated solely for
the purpose of exercising the planning and zoning function. This phenomenon has
been particularly prevalent in Lake County, Illinois, where fifteen such villages were
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Zoning from its inception was looked upon by the courts and local
officials as a means of protecting residential districts from the de-
generative impact of commercial uses.7 Early zoning ordinances were
thus negative in concept. The newer ordinances are, on the other hand,
designed for positive planning, as devices for establishing suitable areas
for all uses while at the same time setting up safeguards to enable the
various uses to exist along side each other without suffering ill effects
by reason of this proximity." Urban developments in the expanding
metropolitan areas of Illinois have encountered many problems which
might never have arisen if the available tools of community planning
had been properly applied in the first instance by local government
officials. During the last decade, the professional city planner has
organized between 1956 and 1960. These communities may be identified by their small
populations either concentrated in a very small area or in a relatively large arca as evi-
denced by the following density statistics:
Date of Density per
Incorporation Population square mile
Long Grove ........... 1956 631 102
Lincolnshire ............ 1957 550 1,058
Lindenhurst ........... 1957 1,282 806
Vernon Hills ........... 1958 124 1,240
Old Mill Creek ......... 1958 135 37
Hawthorn Woods ...... 1958 236 138
Indian Creek ........... 1958 238 118
Kildeer ................ 1958 168 81
Barrington Hills ........ 1959 293 101
Lake Barrington ........ 1959 176 96
North Barrington ....... 1959 281 331
Deer Park .............. 1959 465 213
Riverwoods ............ 1959 234 289
M ettawa ............... 1960 125 74
Oak Grove ............. 1960 198 233
LAKE COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY POPULATION REPORT, Table
11 (1960).
This article has not attempted to take up the subject of annexation as a device used
by municipalities in planning for their ultimate growth and development. During the
past decade annexation has been used by many municipalities for this purpose. See
article on expanding cities, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1960, p. 1., col. 6.
For a discussion of subdivision control legislation see Note, 28 IND. L. J. 544 (1953).
7 City of Aurora v.Burns, 319 fI1. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
8 Babcock, The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1957).
Most of the newer ordinances contain provisions for the amortization of non-conform-
ing uses and structures which serve to reduce their blighting effects. Comment, 26
U. CHI. L. REv. 442 (1959).
0 Comment, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 470, 474 (1953); BOARD O COMMISSIONERS, COOK
COUNTY, op. cit. supra note 3.
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come into his own. More and more, his advice is being sought by local
governments to assist them in planning for development yet to come
and to help solve the problems caused by lack of planning in past
years.10
SUBDIVISION CONTROL LEGISLATION
In Illinois, subdivision controls have not been scrutinized by the
courts to the same extent as zoning regulations. It was not until 1956
that the first case involving subdivision controls was decided by the
Supreme Court of Illinois. This case, Petterson v. City of Naperville,"
involved the extra-territorial power granted to cities and villages to
control subdivision of lands located within one and one-half miles of
their corporate limits. The case also involved the power granted under
section 2 of the City and Villages Plan Commission Act 2 to prescribe
reasonable requirements for public streets, curbs, and gutters in the
interests of the health and safety of the inhabitants of the city. The
court found that subdivision controls were a legitimate exercise of the
police power and that the legislature could grant cities and villages the
power to control the development of subdivisions outside their corpo-
rate limits by requiring them to install paved streets and curbs and gut-
ters within the subdivision.
It became evident to local government authorities early in the post-
war subdivision boom that tax revenues, which were derived by the
schools and other public bodies from new subdivision developments,
did not provide sufficient funds for the services rendered. Furthermore,
there was a tax lag between the time that the homes were occupied and
the time that the taxing bodies received the first tax revenues from new-
ly improved property."5 Attempts were made by several communities to
10 In 1950, 77.38% of 862 municipalities of over 10,000 population reporting planning
data to the American Society of Planning Officials, Chicago, Illinois, had official plan-
ning agencies; whereas in 1960, 91.22% of 1,002 reporting municipalities had official
agencies. 24.59% of the same reporting municipalities spent over $1,000 for planning
services in 1950, while 59.98% spent in excess of such amount in 1960. INTERNATIONAL
CITY MANAGERS Ass'N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK (1960); INTERNATIONAL CITY MAN-
AGER'S Ass'N, THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK (1950).
A regional plan commission was organized in Lake County, Illinois, for the first time
in 1957. In the same year the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Plan Commission
was created. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 3051-89 (1959). The commission has advisory
planning jurisdiction over the six counties in Northeastern Illinois (Cook, Lake, Mc-
Henry, Kane, Du Page, and Will).
119 Ill.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24 § 53 (2) (1959).
13 ILL. AsS'N OF SCHOOL BDS., SCHOOL INCOME IN ILLINOIS (1959).
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require payments per lot to school authorities as a condition of
approval of the plat of subdivision. This practice was held invalid in
Gould v. City of Park Ridge,'4 decided by the Circuit Court of Cook
County in 1956.
The Illinois Cities and Villages Act authorizes municipalities to
adopt plans establishing "reasonable requirements for public streets,
alleys, ways for public service facilities, parks, playgrounds, school-
grounds, and other public grounds."" It was not until 1960 that the
court intimated that under this section a community might require a
subdivider to provide public facilities in addition to streets, sewers,
and curbs and gutters as a condition of approval of his subdivision plat.
The subdivision control ordinance of the Village of Downers Grove
required subdividers to dedicate for public use one acre of land for
each seventy-five building sites but not less than one acre for each
seventy-five family units, and in addition required dedication of land
for educational purposes to facilitate the establishment of school
facilities convenient to the proposed subdivision. The Circuit Court
had held the entire ordinance invalid and also enjoined the village and
its officers from requiring a certificate of compliance from the Boards
of Education in the village as a prerequisite to the approval of a sub-
division plat. In Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,16 the Supreme
Court reversed in part, holding that the Circuit Court erred in holding
the public grounds dedication provision invalid, but affirmed the in-
validity of the "educational facilities" provision and the requirement
of monetary contribution in lieu of dedication of land as unauthorized
by statute. In what may be a landmark statement for metropolitan
planning in Illinois, the court said:
The provisions of the statute with respect to reasonable requirements for pub-
lic streets, school grounds and the like, appear to be based upon the theory
that the developer of a subdivision may be required to assume those costs
which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which
would otherwise be cast upon the public.17
14 No. 56 C 12430, Cir. Ct., Cook County, Sept. 7, 1956. The decision of Judge Cor-
nelius Harrington was not appealed. But, see 1959 amendment to § 277 of the New York
Town Law specifically authorizing as a condition to approval of the plat compulsory
dedication by subdividers of land for recreational purposes or payments to the town
in lieu thereof. 61 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS 5 277 (McKinney 1951).
15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, S 53 (2) (1959).
16 19 111.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
17 Id. at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 233.
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The court warned that "it does not follow that communities may use
this point of control to solve all of the problems which they can fore-
see," and called attention to the distinction made in a California case' 8
between the dedication of facilities required to serve the subdivision
and the dedication of facilities which will benefit the community gen-
erally. It is clear that the court felt that requiring dedication for the
broader purpose would be unconstitutional. Although the court held
that to require dedication for "educational purposes" was improper, it
did not decide whether a municipality could require dedication for
"school grounds," a narrower purpose.19
The validity of reasonable subdivision requirements is now assured.
The courts, however, have not permitted municipalities to require
contribution from subdividers to the initial cost of public facilities
located outside the subdivision to serve the needs of the residents of
the area being subdivided, or the dedication for public purposes of
lands within the subdivision for the benefit of the entire community.
ZONING DECISIONS-A TURN IN THE TIDE
Turning from subdivision control to zoning, one finds a marked
change in emphasis in the decisions rendered within the last ten years.
In a majority of the more recent decisions, the courts have supported
the municipal authorities. 20 In the earlier cases, a property owner like-
ly would be victorious if he was able to prove that the market value of
his property was decreased, even slightly, by the regulation, the court
declaring the regulation invalid and permitting the property owner to
proceed with the development of his land in whatever manner he
Is Id. at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 234. The California case referred to by the court is Ayers
v. City Council, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
19 In August 1960, a landowner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Village of
Mr. Prospect to approve his plat which did not conform to the section of the village's
official plan requiring the dedication of public grounds, in addition to streets, alleys,
and parking areas. In Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 60 C
837, Cir. Ct., Cook County, August 1960, the court stated that the prerequisite of dedi-
cation of public ground as a condition for approval of a plat clearly constituted "a
taking of private property for public use," that "the benefit of public lands benefits
the whole community," and that a regulation which requires the donation of land for
the benefit of the general community is not an exercise of the police power. The Mt.
Prospect case is pending on appeal before the Illinois Supreme Court as Docket No.
36151. The case has been argued but no decision has been rendered as of this date.
20 Babcock, The Illinois Supreme Court and Zoning: A Study in Uncertainty, 15
U. Cm. L. REV. 87 (1947); Cf. Babcock, The New Cbicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw.
U, L. REV. 174, 175 (1957).
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desired.2 ' This emphasis on the monetary value of land is no longer the
sole basis for the decisions. Although the change is not always apparent
in any one case, the Supreme Court of Illinois can now be counted on
in anything but an extreme situation to follow the rule so aptly stated
in Reitman v. Village of River Forest:
To overcome the presumption of validity it is incumbent on the property
owner to prove by clear and affirmative evidence that the restriction is ar-
bitrary and unreasonable. 22
No longer is the validity or invalidity of a zoning regulation deter-
mined solely by its effect on the property zoned. The test now is: "Is
the regulation justified in the public welfare as viewed by the legis-
lative authorities of the municipality?" If the regulation benefits the
community, then the property owner must accept the consequences
of the regulation to his property. Only when the court determines that
the benefit to the general welfare is relatively small as compared to the
detriment to the property owner resulting from the zoning regulation,
will the court consider the loss in value to the landowner or the result-
ing limitation on the use of his property as reasons for holding the
regulation invalid. 3
21 Midland Coal Corp. v. County of Knox, 1 Ill.2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953).
229 ll.2d 448,452, 137 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1956).
23 The authorities upon which the courts rely when upholding the legislative discre-
tion of the municipality are reviewed in First Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 7 lll.2d
213, 130 N.E.2d 267 (1955), wherein the court stated: "Where the proper authorities
adopt a zoning ordinance pursuant to a legislative grant, a presumption favoring its
validity always obtains." Id. at 225, 130 N.E.2d at 274. For other cases upholding the
legisative action of the municipality, see Kinney v. City of Joliet, 41111. 289, 103 N.E.2d
473 (1952); Miller Bros. Lumber Co. v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 162, 111 N.E.2d 149
(1953); Reitman v. Village of River Forest, 9 Ill.2d 448, 137 N.E.2d 801 (1956); Wehr-
meister v. County of DuPage, 10 Ill.2d 604, 141 N.E.2d 26 (1957); Bolger v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 10 Ill.2d 596, 137 N.E.2d 801 (1957); Jacobson v. City of Evanston, 10
lll.2d 61, 139 N.E.2d 199 (1956); Village of Lake Bluff v. Home, 24 111. App.2d 343, 164
N.E.2d 217 (1960); Stratford Aire Ass'n v. Hibser, 26 Ill. App.2d 214, 167 N.E.2d 586
(1960).
It is suggested that the authorities last cited be compared with the argument of the
court in the cases holding muncipal zoning regulation unconstitutional. For a review
of the case cited as authority when the zoning ordinance is held invalid see Bauske v.
City of Des Plaines, 13 11.2d 169, 148 N.E.2d 584 (1958) (wherein it was stated: "It is
not the monetary loss to the plaintiffs which here compels a finding of invalidity, but
that such loss is utterly unrelated to any substantial public benefit to be derived." Id. at
181, 148 N.E.2d at 591); LaSalle Nat'l Bank, Trustee v. County of Cook, 12 ll.2d 40,
145 N.E.2d 65 (1957). (The court there stated: ". . . the public welfare does not
require the restriction and resulting loss. . . .[The] presumption of validity is dis-
sipated." Id. at 47, 145 N.E.2d at 69); People ex rel. Alco Deree Co. v. City of Chicago,
2 I11.2d 350, 118 N.E.2d 20 (1954). (The court in the Alco case said: "Construing the
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The last decade saw the renunciation of an established zoning doc-
trine, the judicial recognition of a doctrine previously given tacit
approval, and the creation of a new doctrine. Courts over the last
twenty years have given grudging approval to the "frontage consent"
ordinance, a provision enabling residents within a specified radius of a
tract of land to effectually prevent the establishment of a proposed
use. 4 Frontage consent requirements pertained to uses which the
evidence most favorably to plaintiff, it merely shows a legitimate difference of opinion
as to the reasonableness of the amendatory zoning ordinance." Id. at 357, 118 N.E.2d
24); Gait v. County of Cook, 405 I11. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950); Krom v. City of Elm-
hurst, 8 Il1.2d 104, 133 N.E.2d 1 (1956); Dalkoff v. City of Rock Island, 17 Ill.2d 342,
161 N.E.2d 292 (1959); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 6 ll1.2d 419, 129 N.E.2d
1 (1955); Langguth v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 5 Ill.2d 49, 124 N.E.2d 879 (1955);
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Franklin Park, 4 Il1.2d 304, 122 N.E.2d 804
(1954).
It is significant that in the cases upholding a zoning restriction strong emphasis is
placed upon the burden on the property owner in each instance to prove the regulation
arbitrary, confiscatory, or discriminatory. Bolger v. Village of Mount Prospect, supra.
In the cases holding ordinances invalid the emphasis is on existing uses and zoning of
nearby property (Krom v. City of Elmhurst, supra); the extent of which property
values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions (Midland Elec. Coal Corp.
v. County of Knox, I Ill.2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953); the extent to which the de-
struction of property value promotes the health, safety, morals, or general welfare
of the public (Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Franklin Park, supra); the
relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship imposed on the individual
property owner (Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, I 1l.2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315 (1953));
the suitability of the subject property for zoned purposes (Langguth v. Village of Mt.
Prospect, supra); and the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned con-
sidered in the context of land development in the vicinity of the subject property
(Krom v. Village of Elmhurst, supra).
24 E.g., CHICAGO ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 40, § 40-5 (1957):
"No person shall locate or construct on any lot fronting on any street or alley in
any block in which one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used ex-
clusively for residence purposes, or within fifty feet of any such street, any building,
structure or place used for the following purposes, without the written consent of a
majority of the property owners according to frontage on both sides of such street or
alley.
"A gas reservoir, manufacture of gas, stock yards, slaughter house, packing house,
smoke house or place where fish or meats are smoked or cured, soap factory, glue
factory, size or gelatine factory, renderies, fertilizer factory, tannery, storing or scrap-
ing of raw hides or skins, lime kiln, cement or plaster of paris factory, oil cloth or
linoleum factory, factory for the manufacture of rubber from the crude material, saw
mill or planing mill, wood working establishment, starch factory, glucose or dextrine
factory, textile factory, laundry run by machinery, factory combined with a foundry,
iron and steel works, brass or copper works, sheet metal works, blacksmithing or horse-
shoeing shop, boiler making, foundry, smelter, metal refinery, machine shop, stone or
monument works run by machinery, asphalt manufacturing or refining, paint or varnish
factory, oil or turpentine factory, printing ink factory, tar distillation or manufacture,
tar roofing, tar paper or tarred fabric factory, ammonia, chlorine, or bleaching powder
factory, celluloid factory, place for the distillation of wood or bones, lamp black fac-
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municipality felt had potentials of danger or nuisance, such as garages
and filling stations, machine shops, taverns, and amusement activities,
giving the adjacent owners ad hoc zoning jurisdiction by requiring
their consent to the establishment of the use. The procedure would
come into play only if the zoning ordinance permitted the use, pro-
ducing the curious anomaly of a municipality expressly allowing the
landowner to use the property in a specific manner and, by requiring
frontage consents, granting the neighboring landowners the power to
prevent the use. Efforts were made to nullify the entire concept, but
the most that the courts would do was to vacate its application to the
specific property involved. When done, the court held either that the
development of the area in question was such that it would be un-
reasonable to prohibit the proposed use or that the use was not one that
justified the frontage consent requirement. The court continually ad-
hered to the view that the frontage consent doctrine was not invalid
per se.25
In Drovers Trust & Say. Bank v. City of Chicago,26 the Supreme
Court came to the conclusion that the frontage consent ordinance was
unconstitutional, holding that such provisions did not encompass any
governmental objects not already included within the scope of the
zoning ordinance. It found that the frontage consent ordinance was an
invalid delegation of legislative power and that the ultimate determina-
tion of the detriment to the public welfare must be made, not by indi-
vidual landowners, but by the municipality.
Early zoning ordinances were of the cumulative type, taking as
their point of departure the then unquestioned premise that single-
family residence was the highest zoning classification and industrial the
lowest.2 7 Between these two extremes were generally found multiple-
family, apartment, business and commercial districts. It was assumed
that as one went down the ladder, lower classifications became in-
creasingly "bad" and accordingly all higher uses could be permitted in
tory, sulphurous acid, sulphuric acid, nitric or hydrochloric acid manufacture, factories
or other manufacturing establishments using machinery or emitting offensive or noxious
fumes, odors or noises, storage warehouses, storing or baling of junk or scrap paper or
rags, shoddy manufacture or wool scouring, second hand store or yard, medical dis-
pensary, or incineration or reduction of garbage, offal, dead animals or refuse."
25 See Valkanet v. City of Chicago, 13 I1.2d 268, 148 N.E.2d 767 (1958).
26 18 Ill.2d 476, 165 N.E.2d 314 (1960).
27 City of Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); e.g., Highland Park, III.,
Zoning Ordinance, Feb. 24, 1947; CmcAGo ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 194A (1942).
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the lower classifications, an attitude which maintains today in many
ordinances. In recent years, with the advent of new restricted zoning
classifications,2" it became increasingly evident that enlightened zoning
and planning, in addition to limiting industrial and commercial uses in
residential districts, should likewise prohibit the so-called higher resi-
dential uses in the non-residential districts. Accordingly, the concept
of exclusive zoning districts evolved. The classification would not be
considered as high or low but would stand by itself and would not em-
brace any of the other uses permitted in other classifications.2
In 1959, the Village of Morton Grove adopted an ordinance pro-
hibiting residential development in commercial and industrial districts.
A developer desiring to establish residential units in a commercial dis-
trict challenged the ordinance in a mandamus proceeding. The Su-
preme Court of Illinois, in an opinion of first impression,3 ° found the
exclusive zoning classification a valid exercise of the police power.
Recognizing that the ordinance was a departure from the stereotype
of the past, the court accepted the exclusive zoning concept, as cor-
related with the basic tenets of zoning regulation.31
In the effort to make zoning ordinances comprehensive and to in-
clude within each zoning district compatible activities, it became evi-
dent that there were particular uses which could not be placed
properly in any specific zoning district but nevertheless should be pro-
vided for in the ordinances. These uses often were those which were
28 E.g., Highland Park, Ill., Zoning Ordinance-Office, Research, and Compatible
Uses, art. lIA, Feb. 1, 1960; Highland Park, Ill., Zoning Ordinance-Planned Business
Center, art. 14, § 14-22.01, July 14, 1958; Bannockburn, Ill., Zoning Ordinance-Com-
mercial Park Dist., S 5.9, June 13, 1960. Communities throughout the State of Illinois
recently have been considering such innovations as "Flood Plain" zoning, which im-
poses restrictions in areas subject to periodic flooding, and "Cluster Plan" zoning,
whereby area requirements in particular districts can be lessened in return for dedica-
tion of property for public use, without an increase in the density per acre of the
population in the development.
29 E.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MuNIcu'AL CODE ch. 194A (1957), and particularly art. 10,
covering manufacturing districts, which expressly prohibits residential development
other than units incidental to the principal manufacturing use.
30 People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove, 16
Ill.2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
81 ".... In short, whether industry and commerce are excluded from the residential
areas, or residences from industrial and commercial areas, it is not unreasonable for a
legislative body to assume that separation of the areas would tend in the long run to
insure a better and more economical use of municipal services, such as schools, pro-
viding police protection, preventing and fighting fires, and better use of street facili-
ties. The general welfare of the public may be enhanced if industry and commerce are
provided with a favorable climate." Id. at 188, 157 N.E.2d at 36.
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large in size, quasi-public in nature, and occasionally had obnoxious
characteristics..3 2 Examples were public and municipal buildings, gar-
bage dumps, schools, hospitals, utility and telephone stations, trans-
portation terminals, some private amusement enterprises, and trailer
camps. Most modem ordinances have provisions for allowance of
"special uses" not confined to any particular district which are allowed
only when their use would be compatible to the public welfare and not
detrimental to the interests of adjacent landowners. The procedure for
allowance of special use is generally similar to that for amendments,
providing for a hearing before the Plan Commission or Zoning Board
of Appeals which in turn recommends allowance or disallowance to
the corporate authority.33 The special use procedure has been em-
ployed extensively in Illinois, notwithstanding the absence of express
provision in either the County34 or Cities and Villages Enabling Acts.35
In Kotrich v. County of DuPage, 36 a special permit was granted for
country club operation under provisions of the DuPage County Zoning
Ordinance. Adjacent landowners sought a declaratory judgment, con-
tending inter alia that the procedure was invalid. The Supreme Court in
upholding the ordinance confirmed what all zoning practitioners had
assumed, that the special use was a valid form of zoning. In meeting
the contention that the County Zoning Enabling Act did not expressly
32 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 194A, art. 11.10-1 (1957), preamble to Special Use
section:
. "Purpose. The development and execution of a comprehensive zoning ordinance is
based upon the division of the City into districts within which districts the use of land
and buildings and the bulk and location of buildings and structures in relation to the
land are substantially uniform. It is recognized, however, that there are variations in
the nature of special uses which, because of their unique characteristics, cannot be
properly classified in any particular district or districts, without consideration in each
case, of the impact of those uses upon neighboring land and of the public need for the
particular use at the particular location. Such variations in the nature of special uses
fall into two categories:
"(1) Uses either municipally operated, or operated by publicly regulated utilities or
uses traditionally affected with a public interest; and
"(2) Uses entirely private in character but of such an unusual nature that their
operation may give rise to unique problems with respect to their impact upon
neighboring property or public facilities."
33 Bannockburn, Ill., Zoning Ordinance, §§ 9.10-1, 9.10-5, June 13, 1960 (hearing be-
fore Plan Commission with final allowance by ordinance); Cf. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE ch. 194A, arts. 11.10-1 to -6 (1957) (special uses classified as variations with final
jurisdiction in the Zoning Board of Appeals).
34 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 5§3151-61 (1959).
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 73-1 to -13 (1959).
a6 19 111. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601 (1960).
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authorize the employment of the special use technique, the court
found that there were uses which could not be allocated to specific
districts and that their allowance by established procedures was a
proper method of zoning.
Following World War II, challenges to zoning classifications intensi-
fied.87 Notwithstanding the amendment and variation provisions avail-
able, most cases attacking the ordinances originated in court. Challenges
to the ordinances were by injunction, mandamus, or declaratory judg-
ment, the allegations being that the limitation on use was an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of property. The decrees found the ordinances void
as applied to the subject properties. In Bright v. Evanston,8 the Supreme
Court established as a precept of zoning law that one could not seek
judicial intervention while administrative relief on the local level was
available and unsought. The plaintiff, proposing to construct an apart-
ment building in a single-family residence district, brought a declara-
tory judgment action against the City of Evanston, contending that
the limitations as applied to his property were void. A lower court
decree in favor of the plaintiff was reversed, the Supreme Court hold-
ing that variation provisions contained in the Evanston zoning ordi-
nance 39 which were available to plaintiff had not been utilized, and
until sought, the court proceeding was premature. The Evanston zon-
ing ordinance permitted the City Council to vary the ordinance after a
hearing before the Zoning Board of Appeals pursuant to optional pro-
visions contained in the statute.40 No limitation precluded a variation
to allow multiple-family structures in a single-family residence district.
The basic rationale of the court was that until local remedies were
sought it was not possible to determine whether a justiciable contro-
versy existed. Conceivably, the municipality could grant the relief
sought, making resort to court unnecessary. The court held that where
the attack was on the application of the ordinance to a specific parcel
of land, exhaustion of available administrative remedies was required.
Excluded from application of the doctrine were those cases where
attack was upon the ordinance in its entirety, or where the challenge
was to the text of the ordinance in its general terms and not merely to
37 Lawton, Jr., Procedural Implications of Recent Zoning Decisions, 40 Cm. B. REC.
15 (1958).
38 10 IU.2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956).
39 Evanston, Ill., Zoning Ordinance § 15, March 25, 1940.
40 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 73-4 (1959).
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its application to specific property. Where no suitable variation provi-
sions existed in the ordinance to permit the use proposed, the Bright case
doctrine was not applicable.4" Following Bright, in Bank of Lyons v.
County of Cook,42 the court held that the plaintiff was obliged to seek
a use variation for a trailer park before coming to court, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals, which
had final authority, had never granted use variations, had told plaintiff
informally that his request would be futile, and had failed to urge non-
compliance with the Bright case doctrine in defense of plaintiff's suit.
The Bright case posed the question of whether exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies required plaintiff to seek an amendment to the zon-
ing ordinance before taking court action, and secondly, whether plain-
tiff who had sought an amendment had complied with the doctrine. In
Herman v. Village of Hillside," the court held that where the land-
owner had sought amendment, the Bright case doctrine was satisfied and
the aggrieved plaintiff need not seek a variation. Here the same body
heard applications for both variations and amendments which were
subsequently passed upon in each case by the corporate authority. On
analysis the result of the decision appears contrary to the Bright doc-
trine. A municipality unwilling to amend its comprehensive ordi-
nance at the request of an individual might be disposed to grant a
variation. The court, however, characterizes such multiple procedures
as giving "lip service to a technicality," 44 albeit a technicality which
the court took elaborate pains to create.45
4 1 Eckhardt v. City of Des Plaines, 13 11.2d 562,150 N.E.2d 621 (1958).
42 13 I1l.2d 493, 150 N.E.2d 97 (1958).
43 15 11.2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1958).
44 Id. at 408, 155 N.E.2d at 59.
45 Fox v. City of Springfield, 10 Ill.2d 198, 139 N.E.2d 732 (1957), first brought into
focus the problems of the landowner who had complied with Bright, had still not
gotten what he wanted, and desired to go to court. It would seem obvious that where
the zoning board of appeals has only an advisory function, with the ultimate variation
jurisdiction vested in the corporate authority, the Administrative Review Act (ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-79 (1959)) is inappropriate. This would seem to be the sole
holding of the Fox case. In such case plaintiff can seek the so-called traditional remedies
of injunction, mandamus, and declaratory judgment to challenge the constitutionality
of the classification, or the propriety of the variation denial. Whether the landowner,
previously unsuccessful before the zoning board of appeals having final jurisdiction,
can then proceed with injunction, declaratory judgment, or mandamus has not been
answered by the Supreme Court. The question has been answered in two ways in the
Appellate Court. In Believers of Islam, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 19 111. App.2d 480, 154
N.E.2d 311 (1958), the plaintiff, having been denied a variation before a zoning
board of appeals with final jurisdiction, was told by the Appellate Court that his only
recourse was under the Administrative Review Act and a declaratory judgment pro-
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A new procedural doctrine applicable to zoning matters is found in
three cases, Franklin v. Village of Franklin Park,46 Nelson v. City
of Rockford47 and Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park.48
Previously, the court had held that where a zoning ordinance was de-
clared void in injunction and declaratory judgment procedures, the
decree could provide only that the ordinance was void as applied to
the subject property. A zoning vacuum was thereby created, as no
particular use could be specified in the decree. Where this was done,
the decree itself would be held void.49 This condition led to several un-
satisfactory results. The decree creating a zoning vacuum left no limi-
tation on the use of the property. A plaintiff originally proposing an
apartment building in a single-family district could establish an indus-
trial use without limitation. Likewise, where a zoning "void" was de-
creed, the municipality could re-classify the property to fill the gap
with a classification different from the one declared invalid, yet so
limited as to preclude the successful plaintiff from proceeding with
his desired use. In the Richton Park case, the court concluded that the
two foregoing situations required a departure from previous decisions
and permitted a decree to specify the contemplated use:
In such cases the relief awarded may guarantee that the owner will be allowed
to proceed with that use without further litigation and that he will not pro-
ceed with a different use.50
The court recognizes that what it is permitting is not substantially dif-
ferent from the type of decree entered in a mandamus proceeding
where the municipality is directed to issue a permit for a particular use
or where the Administrative Review Act is used to direct the granting
of a variation.
ceeding was not available to him to challenge the ordinance on constitutional grounds
in an original action. In People ex rel. Builders Supply v. Village of Maywood, 22 Ill.
App.2d 283, 160 N.E.2d 689 (1959), the Appellate Court by way of dicta indicated that
traditional remedies were available to the unsuccessful applicant for variation before
the zoning board of appeals with final jurisdiction. The latter view seems proper. The
Bright case having been satisfied by resort to variation, the landowner should not be
foreclosed from testing the ordinance on constitutional grounds in a de novo action
merely because of the fortuitous circumstance of where the municipality has placed its
variation jurisdiction.
46 19 Ill.2d 381, 167 N.E.2d 195 (1960).
4719 Ill.2d 410, 167 N.E.2d 219 (1960).
48 19 ll1.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 (1960).
49 LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill.2d 253, 122 N.E.2d 519 (1954).
50 Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill.2d 370, 379, 167 N.E.2d
406,411 (1960).
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CONCLUSION
The discernible pattern of court decisions on the subject of munic-
ipal planning during the last decade has been to support the efforts of
the corporate authorities to correlate land use to the public welfare.
Where reasonable efforts were made, the court would find a basis for
allowance, notwithstanding the fact that the techniques employed
represented a departure from more conservative and pre-tested doc-
trines. This would seem to maintain whether the innovation was pro-
cedural or substantive. In short, the burden has shifted from requiring
the city to justify every act, to a recognition of prima facie validity,
with the complainant obliged to demonstrate arbitrary action. The
future would seem to indicate adaption of the now recognized prin-
ciples to larger and more comprehensive geographic areas. Overall
metropolitan area planning is beyond the drawing board stage and
should receive far greater attention in the next decade from both the
courts and local governmental authorities."'
51 Studenski, Metropolitan Areas 1960, 49 NAT'L Civic REV. 467, 537 (1960).
